It is my privilege and pleasure to introduce Professor Carol Newsom, who will deliver her official address as the President of the Society of Biblical literature from November 2010 to November 2011.

Carol Newsom is a native of Birmingham, Alabama, where she attended the public schools and Birmingham-Southern College, graduating summa cum laude in 1971. She continued her graduate education at Harvard Divinity School, from which she received a master’s degree in theological studies in 1975, and Harvard University, from which she received the Ph.D, from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations in 1982. She holds the Doctor of Divinity degree, honoris causa, from Birmingham-Southern College and the University of Copenhagen.

Since 1980 Professor Newsom has taught Hebrew Bible at the Candler School of Theology and the Graduate Division of Religion at Emory University. In 2005 she was named a Charles Howard Candler Distinguished Professor at Emory University, in recognition of excellence in research and teaching.

She has been a member of the international team of translators of the Dead Sea Scrolls since the mid 1980s (she was the first woman to serve as a translator), editing and translating the Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice, the Apocryphon of Joshua, and other texts. Most recently, she has prepared the translation of the Qumran Thanksgiving Psalms for the official publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls in the Discoveries in the Judaean Desert Series, published by the Clarendon Press. Her interpretive work on the Qumran community includes the book The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community in the Dead Sea Scrolls (Brill, 2004). She is also a scholar of the wisdom literature, having published a commentary on
the book of Job (in the New Interpreter’s Bible Commentary series with Abingdon Press) and a monograph, *The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations* (Oxford University Press, 2003). Professor Newsom has also given her attention to the ways in which women are portrayed in the Bible and the ways in which the Bible has come to be interpreted by women. She is co-editor with Sharon Ringe of the *Women’s Bible Commentary*. A twentieth-anniversary revised and expanded edition of the commentary will be published by Westminster John Knox in 2012.

Newsom has served the Society of Biblical Literature in various capacities, chairing the Nominating Committee in 1988 and 1989 and serving as Program Committee Chair, 1992–95. She also served as the Vice-President and President of the Southeastern Region of the SBL in 1991–92.
The great sage and scribe Jesus Ben Sira was, for the most part, a writer in confident control of his message, one who seldom engaged in direct polemics with other points of view. On occasion, however, his irritation with claims that he finds wrong-headed comes sharply into view. One of these moments is in ch. 15 of the Wisdom of Ben Sira, where the sage stoutly objects to those who—as he characterizes them—claim that it is God's fault that they have sinned. In response, Ben Sira mounts a vigorous defense of the Deuteronomic view of moral agency, in which persons have free will and the unimpeded capacity to choose between “life and death” (Sir 15:15–17). It is difficult to know who Ben Sira’s opponents actually were, because it is unlikely that he gives a fair representation of their position in the whiny words he attributes to them, “It was the Lord’s doing that I fell away. . . . It was he who led me astray” (15:11–12). In some ways the position sounds closest to the moral anthropology articulated three hundred years later in the book of 4 Ezra. There Ezra sharply questions the model of free human agency and attributes the moral failure of the vast majority of persons to the “evil heart” with which humans were created, and which God did not act to remove or correct. While we do not know if the argument that Ezra makes had already been developed by contemporaries of Ben Sira, ample evidence exists for the emergence of a variety of often startling alternatives to the Deuteronomic model of moral agency in various strands of Second Temple Jewish literature.

Curiously, although interest in models of moral psychology has been lively in NT studies, especially as focused on the figure of Paul, this topic has been rather neglected by Hebrew Bible and Second Temple scholars, though a revival of interest in biblical anthropology in general—especially among German-speaking scholars—suggests that interest in this subject may be rising.¹ In other disciplines, the

¹ See, e.g., Der Mensch im Alten Israel: Neue Forschungen zur alttestamentlichen Anthropologie (ed. Bernd Janowski and Kathrin Liess; Freiburg: Herder, 2009); Anthropologische Auf-
“self”—moral and otherwise—has become a subject of intense research in fields as diverse as neuroscience, cultural history, philosophy, theology, psychology, and anthropology. If biblical studies were to reinvigorate its own examination of the self constructed in the Hebrew Bible and early Judaism, which of these fields might provide helpful conversation partners? And what might our field contribute to an interdisciplinary conversation?

Among the different disciplines, neuroscience and anthropology offer particularly useful insights. What makes neuroscience intriguing is its finding that the anatomical structures of the brain responsible for the sense of self are also the ones involved in religious experience. The claim, made most forcefully by Patrick McNamara in *The Neuroscience of Religious Experience*, is that religion and the self co-evolved and that religion is the most important of the cultural means by which a unified or executive self—what can also be described as conscious agency—is constructed and maintained. Because neuroscience is based on the anatomy and chemistry of the brain, it can identify what features and processes of the self are universal. One of the things it reveals is that the default state of consciousness is fragmented and conflicted. Different physiologically and genetically based systems, as well as acquired beliefs and preferences, compete within the person, leading to an unsystematic and uncoordinated series of impulses and desires. The executive self that mediates among these impulses and allows the person to act with coordinated intention over time does not simply emerge biologically by default. It is much more a cultural achievement, historically facilitated and transmitted in large part by religious practices.

Because the self is culturally constructed on an anatomical substructure, remarkably diverse ways exist for achieving the executive self required for human flourishing. Here is where anthropology is helpful, particularly that branch often called “ethnopsychology.” In ethnopsychology, anthropologists investigate “local theories of the person” or “indigenous psychologies,” that is, symbolic accounts

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3 Ibid., 32–38; cf. David Haig, “Intrapersonal Conflict,” in *Conflict* (ed. Martin Jones and A. C. Fabian; Darwin College Lectures; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12–16.

4 Haig, “Conflict,” 21; McNamara, *Neuroscience*, 38.


of how the self is constituted in diverse cultures. Most useful for my purposes are the cross-cultural studies of how human agency is conceptualized. Despite the immense cultural variety, it is possible to identify a small number of variables that each indigenous psychology must address, thus facilitating comparison.

Both neuroscience and anthropology, however, tend to frame their analyses synchronically, as snapshots of a situation at a given time. What the historical disciplines, including biblical studies, can distinctively contribute is a study of changes in the conceptualization of the self over time. While there are numerous excellent studies of the development of the modern western self and on the philosophical debates concerning Greek conceptions of the self, little or no attempt has been made to trace the changing conceptions of the self in the Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism. Is this even possible? To be sure, fewer data exist than for modern or even ancient Greek studies, but there is enough evidence to make the inquiry worthwhile, especially if one focuses on the moral self, which is a primary concern of the biblical and early postbiblical texts.

In the following discussion, I wish to look specifically at the issue of moral agency. To that end I will (1) present a heuristic model from ethnopsychology for representing human agency; (2) briefly describe the contours of the default model of moral agency assumed in the Hebrew Bible; and (3) examine some of the most significant alternatives to the classic Deuteronomic model that are developed in Second Temple literature, along with the possible reasons for their development and their social functions.

I. A TOOL FOR MAPPING MODELS OF AGENCY

One of the problems in cross-cultural or historical inquiry is that of identifying analytical categories that facilitate comparison without improperly imposing the categories native to the researcher. In an important study in ethnopsychology, Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock devised a grid for representing the major vectors that structure cross-cultural models of human agency. They work with two coordinates: location and control. Location refers to the differentiation every society

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8 For an overview of primary sources and secondary studies, see Emma Wasserman, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology (WUNT 2/256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 15–49.
makes between the perceiver and his or her environment. Roughly speaking, this is a differentiation between self and other or between internal and external, though how these terms are given specific cultural realization can admit of considerable difference. The second vector, control, is a way of conceptualizing activity or passivity, that is, whether a person is seen as “in control” or “under the control” of someone or something else⁹ (fig. 1). The two polar models of psychology that these vectors construct are what Heelas and Lock call idealist and passiones.¹⁰ The idealist model is one in which even the external world is understood as dependent on the self. Their example is mystical Tibetan Buddhism, though one might also include here a variety of new age “mind-over-matter” psychologies. Passiones psychologies (from Latin passio: “being acted upon or controlled externally”) are those

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in which the self is seen as controlled by external forces. They illustrate by reference to the Dinka culture, which sees the world of spirits as the active subject and the individual as the object acted upon\(^\text{11}\) (see fig. 2). While these extremes are easy to conceptualize, what does it mean to conceive of the self as controlled by forces located internal to the person? Actually, this is not an uncommon model. One could think of the ancient theory of the four humors, which are located within particu-

\[\text{Figure 2. Examples of Indigenous Psychologies. From Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self (ed. Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock; Language, Thought, and Culture; London: Academic Press, 1981), 41. Used by permission.}\]

lar organs of the body but exercise control over the whole person. Not surprisingly, given what neuroscience says about the default state of consciousness as divided and conflicted, it is commonplace across many cultures to envision the self as internally divided, with one aspect attempting to control another, as in the Greek conception of the internal division of the self into reason, passion, and appetites. More difficult to illustrate is the possibility of a theory of the person in which an externally located element was conceived both as part of the self and in control. Perhaps

some versions of the notion of an “external soul” would fit this model. Even in the modern secular imagination, however, the use of little angel and devil figures on each side of a person’s head, representing the moral conflict of an individual, suggests the way in which a person’s impulses are simultaneously experienced as externalized but still very much one’s own—the metaphorical better and worse angels of our nature.

It would be misleading to think of this schematic model as a set of pigeonholes for static views of the self that are characteristic of cultures as undifferentiated wholes. First, the lived experience of agency includes both control and lack of control, a sense of internal capacity and external restriction. As Heelas notes, every culture will find some way of acknowledging each of these dimensions, though they may be masked or muted, relocated or transformed in some fashion. Second, although one model may predominate in a culture, often a variety of alternative models of the self may coexist, serving different purposes.

II. The Default Model of Moral Agency in the Hebrew Bible

Although the model of the moral self in the Hebrew Bible has its own variations and complexities, it is clear that in terms of the Heelas and Lock model, the common Israelite conception of the self would be in quadrant A—an internalized conceptualization of the self in control. The heart (לב) is the locus of the person’s moral will, and it is this organ that is responsible for a person’s words and actions. It is, as Thomas Krüger puts it, the “moral control and guidance center” of the person.14 It is the executive self. While לב is the most important term for the conceptualization of moral agency in First Temple texts, the term רוח, “spirit,” is also significant. This term has a very broad range of meaning. When applied to a per-

13 This phenomenon has been studied recently by combining the Heelas and Lock model with Robert MacLaury’s cognitive “vantage theory,” which demonstrates the cognitive means by which dominant and recessive vantage points of cultural perception can shift from figure to ground to presupposition as needed for particular purposes, even though one vantage will be the preferred default. See J. Hill and R. MacLaury, “The Terror of Montezuma: Aztec History, Vantage Theory, and the Category of “Person,” in Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World (ed. John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury; Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 82; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1995), 277–329.
15 The most extensive recent study of the uses and function of רוח and the comparable terms in Greek is John R. Levison, Filled with the Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). See also his The Spirit in First Century Judaism (AGJU 29; Leiden: Brill, 2002).
son, it may represent simply the animating breath (as a synonym for נפש). But it can also designate a person’s capacities: their skill or wisdom. It can refer to a person’s disposition, covering both what we would treat as one’s emotional state (“a troubled spirit,” “a calm spirit”) and one’s motivation, intention, or will. So far, what I am describing still fits into the category of an internalized conceptualization of the self in control. The capacity of the person to make moral choices is assumed in most of the biblical literature and is made thematic in Deuteronomical discourse. This is the conceptualization of the normal state of affairs.

The Hebrew Bible, however, recognizes exceptions to this normal condition. Most frequently, external interference is exercised via the רוח. What facilitates this conceptualization is both the nonmaterial nature of the human רוח and the fact that the term “spirit” also characterizes God and other divine beings. In discussing רוח, it is important to distinguish between two things. The רוח that belongs to a person innately (as vitality, capacity, disposition, will) may be enhanced by God. In this case the person is conceptualized as a container. The person is “full of” a spirit, or God “fills” them with a spirit. Most commonly, this has to do with skill, wisdom, or a capacity for leadership, and as an enhancement of a natural capacity it appears still to be understood as a part of the person’s “own” agency. In contrast to this are the cases where a spirit from God is represented as metonymically related to a person, that is, contiguous but external. Here the spirit “comes upon” (רוח על; e.g., Num 24:2; Judg 3:10), “rests upon” (רוח על; e.g., Num 11:26), “clothes” (לבש; e.g., Judg 6:34), “rushes upon” or “grips” the individual (צלח על; e.g., Judg 14:6, 19). In these cases the person is empowered or impelled to do something he otherwise lacks either the capacity or the intention to do. Both the verbs and the prepositions used suggest that this type of experience was felt to be an external control of a person’s agency. This model, however, clearly represents an exception to normal human agency.

While this conceptualization of internal agency and its occasional override is relatively clear, one must also account for ordinary success or failure in exercising good moral choice. To give a full answer to this question would involve much more than what can be done here, but it is possible to identify the critical issues in the

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17 The דל may be affected also, but whether the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart (Exod 4:21; 9:12; 10:20, 27; 11:10; 14:4, 8, 17) or God’s making fat the heart of the people (Isa 6:10a) is actually conceived of as an act of external control requires more analysis than can be provided here.


19 While the great majority of instances follow this pattern, there are three that might represent the spirit as becoming internal to the person, using the preposition -מ (2 Sam 23:2; 1 Kgs 22:23; 2 Kgs 19:7). In two of these, however, the issue is how the spirit directs the individual’s speech, which may account for the choice of the preposition. Only in 2 Kgs 19:7 is it said that God “places a spirit in” (נתןבו), though here, too, the spirit is an external agent that overrides the king’s own perception and intentionality.
Hebrew Bible that can serve as a basis for the remainder of the discussion. Three elements form the fundamental grammar of the moral self in the Hebrew Bible: desire, knowledge, and the discipline of submission to external authority. These elements may be nuanced by other aspects of moral psychology, such as the role of shame in Ezekiel’s account of the reconstruction of failed moral agency, or the role of memory in Deuteronomy in facilitating good moral choice. Nevertheless, the fundamental grammar of the moral self across the Hebrew Bible is constructed by the relation of desire, knowledge, and submission.

Desire is not in and of itself negative, but, unless informed and disciplined, it is unruly and untrustworthy as a guide to moral conduct. After all, desires are—in neuroscientific terms—the uncoordinated impulses of our default consciousness. Not surprisingly, the semantics and imagery of desire play a prominent role throughout the Hebrew Bible: in Genesis 2–3, in other narrative texts, in the Psalms, and in wisdom and prophetic literatures. More important than desire in and of itself is the relation between knowledge and desire. In Genesis 2–3 the combination of desire and knowledge is deemed to be particularly dangerous, apparently because desire is seen as having the upper hand, using the knowledge of good and bad to accomplish its unpredictable ends (Gen 3:6, 22). Elsewhere, however, in the wisdom literature knowledge is precisely what evaluates desires and enables the individual to resist destructive ones and to learn to desire what is good. Michael Fox is correct in arguing that the wisdom tradition has an essentially Socratic understanding of the relation between knowledge and desire—“to know the good is to desire it.”

Knowledge is not simply about states of affairs, however. It is also relational knowledge. Thus, in Hosea, in Deuteronomy, and elsewhere, knowledge of God is cultivated as the basis for correct moral decision making. This type of relational knowledge touches on the third leg of moral decision making, what I have identified as submission to an external authority. This authority may be human (the father and the wise in the wisdom tradition), or it may be divine (God or the Torah of God), but it is a recognition of the fact that the coordination of desire and knowledge is not conceived of as an individual project but is always placed in a collective or social context.

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21 The modern Western analysis of moral formation is more likely to see deference to authority as potentially morally problematic, as in the infamous Milgram experiment, where individuals inflicted what they thought was severe pain on experimental subjects when told to do so by the researcher conducting the experiment. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Tavistock, 1974). Submission to proper authority is a more prominent value in societies in which the socially embedded self rather than the autonomous self is the norm. Jonathan Wyn Schofer (The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004], 17–22) provides an insightful discussion of the role of “subjection” and “chosen subordination to Torah and to God” as an integral part of moral formation in The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan.
Moral failure generally involves a combination of these three elements, though one or another may be stressed. That is, the problem may be framed as obsessive desire, as often in Ezekiel; or it may be framed as a failure of the understanding or even self-deception, as often in Proverbs and Jeremiah; or it may be framed as recalcitrance or rebellion against authority, as often throughout the prophetic corpus. The interaction of the three elements and their ratios construct a dynamic model that accounts in a flexible way for the experience of both good and bad moral decision making. The human being is in no sense ontologically defective—the capacity for moral agency is presumed—but neither is a person innately moral. Reliable moral decision making is a project accomplished between the individual and her community, as desire and knowledge are both shaped in relation to reliable external authority.

One might object that there are expressions of what looks like a radically pessimistic view of moral functioning in several places in the Hebrew Bible—in the Yahwist's negative judgment on humanity in the Primeval History, in the “fool” in the wisdom tradition, in Eliphaz and Bildad’s negative characterization of humanity in Job, and in the despair articulated by Ezekiel and Jeremiah over the status of the human heart. These cases each represent different issues. The Yahwist's judgment that “the whole inclination of the thoughts of their heart was only bad all the time” (Gen 6:5) is indeed a negative judgment on human moral anthropology. This is clear from the fact that even the radical intervention of the flood changes nothing. People are as bad after the flood as they were before (Gen 8:21).22 Though the Yahwist's perspective has played a large role in shaping Western thought, it is actually a minority perspective in the Hebrew Bible.

The case of the fool in Proverbs poses a different issue. Though it is possible that Proverbs holds that some people are simply “born fools,” it is more likely that the inveterate fool is “made” rather than “born.” Where early resistance to the discipline of wisdom is not overcome, it can harden into intractable moral disorder.23 More radical is the judgment of Eliphaz and Bildad that humanity is “loathsome and foul, a being that drinks wrongdoing like water” (Job 15:16; cf. 4:17–21; 25:4–6). This negative anthropology, however, is specifically generated by a contextual desire to emphasize the ontological difference between the divine and the human. It remains an isolated perspective in the Hebrew Bible. Finally, concerning Ezekiel and Jeremiah, it is important to recognize that these prophets use the language of moral agency to address a national political crisis and failure. Thus, their pessimism

23 The sages of Proverbs never explicitly address the question as I have posed it. While they do recognize differences of moral aptitude even among children, the strong emphasis on instruction and discipline in childhood indicates an assumption that few, if any, are born without the capacity for moral selfhood. See the nuanced discussion by Michael Fox, “Who Can Learn? A Dispute in Ancient Pedagogy,” in *Wisdom, You Are My Sister: Studies in Honor of Roland E. Murphy, O.Carm. on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday* (ed. Michael L. Barré; CBQMS 29; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association, 1997), 62–77.
is context specific, although it is articulated as a crisis in moral psychology per se. The Judean mind, which should have been capable of making good moral choices, has revealed itself as so thoroughly defective or corrupted that it is incapable of restoration by the ordinary means of discipline, knowledge, and the redirection of desire. Thus, the very possibility of moral agency is put in question. Both prophetic books reinstate such agency, however, through a divine intervention that transforms the moral organ of the heart itself (Jer 31:33–34; Ezek 36:26–27). These negative moral psychologies, though they represent minor voices in Israelite thought, become important touchstones for the development of more complex and varied approaches in Second Temple literature.

III. Moral Agency in Second Temple Literature

Changes in the conceptualization of the moral self are not unmotivated. Rather, they are an integral part of larger historical and cultural changes. What, then, accounts for the development of new models of the self in Second Temple Judaism? Several interrelated factors appear to be at work. First and most important is the increasing centrality of the Torah in Jewish religious life. If obedience to Torah is vital, then what makes possible or impedes such obedience is vital also—and provides a lively field for contestation. The second and related factor is social differentiation based on Torah—both between Jews and Gentiles and between different groups of Jews. Divergent theories of the person are frequently employed as boundary-marking mechanisms. New religious movements and sectarian forms of religious organization are thus particularly productive contexts for the construction of new models of the moral self. The third factor is the increasing interaction with other cultures—Mesopotamian, Persian, and Hellenistic—all of which provided new resources for symbolizing the self.

Investigating what generates new conceptualizations of the moral self is important, but also important is examining the associated effects of such changing conceptualizations. Significantly, the new models of moral selfhood in Second Temple Judaism frequently focus on the phenomenon of inner moral conflict. By contrast, earlier Israelite literature seldom focused on that issue. The emphasis there is much more on the acquisition of proper insight and the formation of proper desires, so that one does not in fact experience moral conflict but is drawn reliably to what is right (e.g., Deut 4:1–9; 30:6–10; Prov 6:20–24; 7:1–5; 8:1–11). One of the effects of the new focus on inner moral conflict is nothing less than the creation of a different kind of “inner life,” a form of quasi-introspective subjectivity that was simply unavailable with earlier models of the moral self. One is accustomed to thinking of “the birth of subjectivity” as occurring in Greco-Roman culture. But one might argue that a parallel but quite different birth of subjectivity occurs also in Semitic-speaking Judaism, though this has not yet been fully analyzed and explored.
One can categorize the variety of ways of thinking about moral agency in Second Temple Judaism as follows:

1. **Moral agency is affirmed.** This perspective is a reiteration of the Deuteronomic view. There is nothing wrong with the human moral “equipment.” Each person is capable of and responsible for his or her own moral choices.

2. **Moral agency is internally impaired, but the impairment can be overcome.** The impairment may be due to an internal force inherent in persons, or the impairment may come from the outside in the form of demonic spirits. Individuals are still envisioned as active moral agents and held responsible for their actions.

3. **Moral agency is denied—with certain exceptions.** The texts that broach this rather radical notion do so via a reflection on the creation accounts in Genesis 1–3 and conclude that the majority of humanity, as created, is simply not capable of moral agency.

In what follows, I develop each of these categories with pertinent examples. I will, however, concentrate on examples from the Dead Sea Scrolls for two reasons. First, they are simply some of the most interesting and highly developed models of moral psychology. Second, one might think that different and even contradictory models of moral psychology must be held by different groups of Jews, much as Ben Sira distinguishes sharply between his own position and that of his opponents. But that is not necessarily the case. All of the perspectives I have identified occur in texts from the Dead Sea Scrolls, either those authored by sectarians or texts that deeply influenced their thinking. This variety is not as surprising as it might sound. Even logically contradictory models are often found side by side in a culture because they serve different purposes or are invoked in different contexts. Accounting for divergent models within the same community prompts reflection on what these models do.

**Moral Agency Is Affirmed**

This position is articulated early and late in Second Temple Judaism. It occurs around 180 B.C.E. in Sirach (“if you choose, you can keep the commandments”; Sir 15:15) and around 100 C.E. in 2 Baruch (“we have become each his own Adam,” that is, free to choose good or evil; 2 Bar 54:19). Moreover, the Essene Damascus Document explains the purpose of its own teaching as “so that you may choose what [God] desires and reject what he hates” (CD II, 15), and the Qumran Community Rule refers to its members as “those who freely volunteer” (1QS I, 11; V, 1) and requires that they individually swear a binding oath (1QS V, 8). Not surprisingly, in the Qumran documents this model of moral agency occurs largely in contexts that describe a decisive act of commitment. In such rhetorical contexts, what other model would do?
Moral Agency Is Internally Impaired, but the Impairment Can Be Overcome

Even those traditions that affirm moral agency in the strongest terms know that people sometimes do not choose rightly, because of competing desires, impulses, and fears. To speak of impairment, however, is something else. It is a claim that some problem with the moral faculty itself predisposes persons to make bad moral choices. The classic example of such internal impairment is the rabbinic model of the יצרהרע, the evil or bad inclination innate in human beings. The phrase (but not the concept) is drawn from Gen 6:5, where the Yahwist justifies the flood by observing that “all the inclination of the thoughts of [the human] mind was only evil all the time.” Where the Yahwist is simply making a descriptive observation about human conduct, rabbinic thought reifies the יצרה, making it a part of the moral faculties of the person. While there are references in rabbinic literature to a “good” יצרה, it is described as developing subsequently to the יצרהרע and is a reactive rather than a proactive force. The rabbinic anthropology is thus not one of internal moral dualism but a discourse about inner moral conflict and moral formation.

Recent research has made it clear that the fully developed rabbinic concept of the יצרהרע is not to be found in the literature of the Second Temple, nor has that expression acquired the status of a technical term. Nevertheless, there are texts that move toward such a conceptualization. One of these is in the opening admonition of the Damascus Document. By and large this passage uses vocabulary drawn from the familiar biblical language of moral choice and moral failure, but several features indicate that the understanding differs from the earlier biblical texts. The admonition takes the form of a historical review that encompasses a span “from ancient times until now” (CD II, 17), thus suggesting that the pattern it describes is diagnostic of the human condition per se. The key phrases for moral failure are introduced at the beginning. The audience is warned against “the thoughts of a guilty inclination [מחשבות יצר אשמה] and lustful eyes.” Note what has happened to the phrase from Genesis. The noun יצרה has moved from being the nomen regens to being the nomen rectum in the construct phrase “the thoughts of a guilty inclination,” not “the inclination of the thoughts.” “Inclination” is no longer simply a descriptive term but one that identifies a force internal to the human that has to be

25 While the classic study by F. C. Porter (“The YEÇER HARAH: A Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin,” in Biblical and Semitic Studies: Critical and Historical Essays by the Members of the Semitic and Biblical Faculty of Yale University [Yale Bicentennial Publications; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901], 93–156) argued that the concept of the YEÇER HARAH was already substantially attested in Second Temple literature, more recent research by G. H. Cohen Stuart (The Struggle in Man between Good and Evil: An Inquiry into the Origin of the Rabbinic Concept of Yešer Ḥara [Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1984]) makes a strong case that the full development of the concept belongs to the rabbinic period.
intentionally resisted. That “guilty inclination” is paired with “lustful eyes” suggests that the impairment of the moral faculty has to do with disordered desires. In fact, the key negative term in the passage is not רָצָן but רֵאץ, “that which pleases a person,” that is, what a person desires. The generation of the flood is destroyed “because they acted upon their desire” (בָּעַזְתָּם אַתְוֶיִם רֵאָז; II, 20–21). That this is not just an incidental desire but something constituent of the human moral condition is suggested by the repeated use of רְצוּן in the negative phrase “to choose the desire of one’s spirit.” Even more telling than the examples of moral failure is the way in which Abraham is described as “not choosing the desire of his spirit” (CD II, 2–3). That is to say, it is not that Abraham had good desires but rather that he, too, was characterized by wrongful desire but chose not to follow it. Thus, there is something constitutively impaired in human moral psychology—a wrongful desire—that must and can be resisted. How is the resistance possible? It is not through something else internal to the human spirit but rather the מצות אל, the precepts of God. In rabbinc thought, too, it will be the internalizing of the תורה that is most effective in resisting theיצר הרע. 26 Thus, the Damascus Document works with the triad of desire, knowledge, and submission to external authority. Desire is reified as an innate inclination in the human that by itself leads to evil. It is resisted through knowledge of the very story of human good and evil and of the salvific effects of the precepts of God. Through knowledge and submission one acquires the moral agency that allows one to “choose what [God] desires and reject what he hates” (CD II, 15). In choosing for God, however, one is choosing against one’s “natural” self and its desires. If one were to map this model on the Heelas and Lock chart, it would straddle the vector of internal control, since persons may either control or be controlled by theirרצון and guiltyיצר. Thus, it highlights the experience of inner moral conflict.

This model is presented at a strategic rhetorical location in the Damascus Document, before the presentation of the laws and their interpretation that make up the bulk of the document. Knowing this about humans in general and oneself in particular becomes a powerful motivation to make the total commitment required by this covenanted community. Thus, while this model of the moral self is important in its own right, it is also a tool and mechanism for recruiting and binding new members to the sectarian organization.

Moral Agency Is Externally Impaired, but the Impairment Can Be Overcome

Alongside the model of moral agency in which one’s own desire or guilty inclination was seen as an internal impairment of the moral faculty, another model was simultaneously developed—the notion of external demonic forces that cause a per-

26 Schofer, Making of a Sage, 71.
son to do wrong. Although ancient Israel apparently lacked a robust belief in demonic activity, sufficient traces exist in the Hebrew Bible to indicate that belief in demons played some part in popular religion. Traditionally, however, what demons did was to inflict illnesses and sudden death. They did not have, as part of their job portfolio, the moral corruption of human beings. Yet by the mid-second century B.C.E. that notion was relatively common and eventually became a staple of early Christian moral thought. Two lines of development can be traced.

The earliest attestations of demonic forces as impairing a person’s moral functioning are in certain apotropaic prayers that stem from the late Persian or early Hellenistic period. In the Aramaic Levi Document, Levi prays: “Let not any satan rule over me to lead me astray from your way” (ALD supp. 10) and, similarly, in the Plea for Deliverance from the 11QPsalms scroll, the speaker prays: “Let neither a satan nor an impure spirit rule over me; let neither pain nor an evil inclination take possession of my bones” (11Q5 XIX, 15–16). The use of the term שטן, “adversary,” suggests that the background for this notion of moral corruption as caused by external forces is to be found in the figure of the adversary who incites David to commit sin in 1 Chronicles 21 and who attempts to get Job to blaspheme God, though here the term is used to designate a class of evil spirits. What is particularly intriguing about the Plea for Deliverance is the parallelism of the second line. “Pain” was, of course, a traditional symptom of demonic attack. Here, however, it is parallel to “evil inclination,” suggesting that this text conceives of the evil inclination not as a natural part of the human constitution but as a result of demonic activity. This model introduces an important psychological complexity. One’s impulse to do something evil, which is very much an internal psychological experience, is identified not as “one’s own” impulse but as an alien force acting within one. The apotropaic prayer invokes divine assistance against this force, asking that God grant the speaker “a spirit of faithfulness and knowledge.” This spirit, it is generally agreed, is not an external divine spirit but simply a strengthening of the person’s own innate spirit. Thus, there is an assymetry in the way evil—as alien force—and resistance to evil—as strengthened innate spirit—are conceptualized here.

A different etiology for demonic spirits is found in Jubilees, which draws on the Enochic tradition of the fall of the Watchers, itself a development of the tradition in Gen 6:1–4 concerning the “sons of God and the daughters of men.” In 1 Enoch, the offspring of the angelic watchers and the human women are giants

with voracious appetites. When they are killed in the flood, their bodies are destroyed, but their spirits, deriving from their angelic fathers, persist on the earth as evil spirits who hungrily prey on people (1 En. 15:8–16:1). According to 1 Enoch, they have the traditional task of demonic spirits, causing physical illness and sudden death. But they are also said to “lead astray.” 31 Jubilees elaborates this notion. When the evil spirits begin to lead astray the children of Noah, and Noah prays that God bind all of the evil spirits, the angel Mastema, who is in charge of them, argues that 10 percent should be left free, since their function in the world, “to corrupt and lead astray,” is necessary precisely because “the evil of the sons of men is great” (Jub. 10:1–14). Apparently, through their seductions, the demonic spirits cause morally susceptible humans to demonstrate their weak moral nature by committing sins that render them subject to judgment. Here again, what earlier conceptions of moral psychology attributed to a person’s own desires and flawed perceptions is externalized, but in a manner that does not absolve the individual of the moral responsibility to choose (this is not demonic possession). Moreover, the demonic spirits can be resisted, for when Mastema tempts Abraham, he proves himself righteous (Jub. 17:15–18:19).

While this account of demonic activity can be understood simply as a general theory of moral and natural evil, in Jubilees it serves an additional sociopolitical purpose. It is an explanation for the radical difference between Israel and the Gentiles. 32 Jubilees recasts the tradition from Deut 32:8 about the assignment of the nations to the various “sons of God,” saying rather that God “chose Israel to be his people . . . [but he] made spirits rule over all [other peoples] in order to lead them astray from following him” (Jub. 15:31–32). For Gentiles, external demonic control is decisive. For Israel, it is a matter of moral struggle (cf. Jub. 19:28–29).

As sectarian organizations appropriated this notion, they spatialized it, marking the outside world as the place of demonic attack, the inside world as the place of protection. For example, the Damascus Document explains that “on the day that a person takes it upon himself to return to the Torah of Moses [that is, to join the community], the angel Mastema will turn aside from following him, if he keeps his words” (CD XVI, 4). Similarly, in the covenant renewal liturgies at Qumran, entry into the community is associated with rituals of cursing that exclude Belial, the spirits associated with him, and the people of his lot (1QS II, 4–10; 4QBer 7 II, 1–12).

31 The text of this verse is corrupt. See the discussion of George W. E. Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1–36; 81–108 (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 268, 273. The evidence could support an emendation of the underlying Aramaic text either from the verb תעי (“to lead astray”) or from רעע (“to shatter”). Because 1 En. 19:1 seems also to speak of the “spirits of the angels” leading humans astray morally and religiously, Nickelsburg prefers to emend to עני here also. See also Archie T. Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6.1–4 in Early Jewish Literature (WUNT 2/198; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 155–57.

Even for the person who has sought refuge in a community of holiness, the problems associated with moral agency are not entirely resolved. Indeed, religious communities often find it important continually to restage the crisis of inner moral conflict. The most sophisticated and remarkable theory of moral conflict is the Two Spirits teaching in the Qumran Community Rule (1QS III, 13–IV, 26). Scholars debated for some time whether this text, with its teaching about the spirits of truth and deceit, light and darkness, was essentially a text about psychological phenomena (the internal aspects of character that direct and characterize human motivation) or a text about cosmological phenomena (transcendent spirits and angelic beings). The consensus has grown that it is about both. Indeed, among other things, it explains how one’s experience of inner moral conflict is in fact part of a larger cosmological drama that extends from before creation until the eschaton.

The text describes how, when God created humankind, God set for them two spirits in which to walk, the spirits of truth and deceit, light and darkness (1QS III, 17–19). Although the language of “spirit” is notoriously polyvalent, I would agree with Arthur Sekki that these spirits have a transcendent reality but are not to be simply identified with the angelic beings, the “prince of light” and the “angel of darkness.” The two spirits are better understood as transcendent cosmological forces that are instantiated both in angelic agents and in humans. Though transcendent, they exist also “in the innermost part of [a person’s] flesh” (1QS IV, 20). They are thus more reified than simply characterological traits and are envisioned as forces internal to a person. The text draws attention to and explains the psychological experience of inner moral conflict as the struggle of these two spirits within a person. The struggle is not simply internal and psychological, however. Because even the most righteous person has some measure of the spirit of deceit within himself, he is vulnerable to being led astray by the Angel of Darkness and the spirits of his lot (1QS III, 21–24). Thus, there are some similarities to the operation of the demonic forces in Jubilees. In contrast to Jubilees, however, defense against this evil force is not simply through the strengthening of one’s own righteousness through piety and obedience but also through an external force that operates on one’s own internal spirit of truth (1QS III, 24–25). Thus, it is finally impossible to make a clear separation between “internal” and “transcendent” spirits, between characterological motivations, on the one hand, and good and evil angelic forces, on the other. On the Heelas and Lock chart, the Two Spirits model occupies the

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point of intersection of both vectors, as it represents the drama of moral conflict as simultaneously internal and external, psychological and cosmological.

One other thing is noteworthy. To what aspect of the self is this teaching addressed? It is not addressed to the individual’s spirit of truth or to his spirit of deceit. Functionally, this discourse implicitly posits (and, in so doing, helps to create) an “executive self,” a cognitive function that can perceive both spirits and recognize their struggle within himself. To be sure, this executive self identifies the spirit of light and truth as its ideal and desired self. Although that fully unified self will be available only eschatologically, when God removes the spirit of deceit from the innermost part of his flesh (1QS IV, 20), the knowledge provided about the structure and dynamics of the self motivates the sectarian to submit to the disciplines of the community that are designed to enhance the proportion of the spirit of truth within him. Thus, knowledge makes the self desire a purified version of itself and desire the external disciplines that will make him good.36

**Moral Agency Is Denied—with Certain Exceptions**

One of the most startling reconceptualizations of moral psychology builds on terminology from Genesis 6, as well as Genesis 1 and 2, in order to question whether the majority of humanity possesses moral agency at all—not because of any demonic interference but as a result of the way in which they were created.

The two texts from the orbit of Qumran that explore this possibility are a pre-sectarian wisdom text called 4QInstruction and a sectarian text from Qumran, the Hodayot or Thanksgiving Hymns. There is ample evidence that 4QInstruction was highly influential in the development of Qumran sectarian thought and, in particular, on the Hodayot.37 Both texts think through the issue of human moral anthropology using the categories of “flesh” and “spirit,” a set of terminology familiar to NT Pauline scholars.38 But these two texts, though using the same categories, develop significantly different moral anthropologies.

36 For a neuroscientific description of how such an ideal self is posited and achieved, see McNamara, *Neuroscience*, 44–58. He refers to the process as “decentering.”


Before turning to the texts themselves, one might ask where the categories of “flesh” and “spirit” come from. Apparently, they are derived from Gen 6:1–3, where, in the wake of the intermarriage of angels and human women, God declares, “my spirit shall not abide in humans forever, since he is flesh.” 4QInstruction and the Hodayot do not “exegete” this text so much as take its categories to indicate the characteristic difference between the divine (spirit) and the human (flesh). And yet humans do have spirits, since they are animate. Nevertheless, the qualitative difference between divine and human is figured as the difference between “spirit” and “flesh.” This qualitative difference is the basis for the otherwise oxymoronic phrase “the spirit of flesh” (e.g., 4Q416 1.2; 4Q417 1 I, 17; 1QH IV, 37).39

4QInstruction is a pre-sectarian text, probably roughly contemporary with Ben Sira, that embodies a complex merging of eschatological and sapiential thought.40 The text is extremely difficult, and a variety of interpretations have been offered, but in my opinion the puzzle of its theory of moral anthropology has been persuasively solved by John Collins.41 He argues that 4QInstruction preserves the earliest account of a theory of a double creation of humankind, based on the fact that there are two accounts of creation in the Bible, Genesis 1 and Genesis 2–3. These two accounts are interpreted in light of the “spirit/flesh” polarity described in Gen 6:1–3. From the perspective of 4QInstruction, there are two kinds of people in the world. Genesis 1 recounts the creation of a “spiritual people,” who are made in the likeness of the holy ones (interpreting Gen 1:27 “in the image and likeness of אֱלֹהִים as referring to angelic beings, holy ones). To these fortunate persons has been given the capacity to become moral agents, though they must work hard to obtain the necessary insight to actualize this capacity.42 But God created another type of human, the “spirit of flesh” that is not able to discern between good and evil, that is, that lacks moral capacity. This is the being created in Genesis 2 from the dust of the earth. It can be described as having a spirit in that it is animate. But its animating spirit is characterized by “flesh,” and so it can never become a moral agent, since it is only a “spirit of flesh.”

39 Citations of the Hodayot follow the numbering of DJD 40.
40 See the review and discussion of the issues in John Kampen, Wisdom Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 40–44.
42 Jean-Sébastien Rey (4QInstruction: sagesse et eschatologie [STDJ 81; Leiden: Brill, 2009], 302–3) is skeptical of this interpretation, seeing the categories as referring simply to those who have and who have not applied themselves to the study of the “mystery of existence,” arguing that if the categories refer to persons created as spiritual or fleshly, there would be no point to the exhortations to persevere in meditation on the mystery of God (p. 302 n. 81). Rey, however, fails to distinguish between the capacity for moral selfhood and the actualization of that capacity.
In this novel understanding of humanity one can see again the impulse to use a theory of moral agency in order to differentiate between elect and nonelect. In this respect it serves a function similar to the theory of demonic agency in *Jubilees* as a means of differentiating two groups. As a theory of moral agency, *4QInstruction* is, on the one hand, quite radical, since it denies to the vast majority of persons—Jews as well as Gentiles—the capacity to be moral agents. But with respect to its primary focus, it is probably not as radical as it first appears, since the authors of *4QInstruction* are not interested in people who have a spirit of flesh but only in the spiritual people, who are the ones with the capacity for moral agency. In their process of developing moral agency, the spiritual people are not dissimilar to the addressees of earlier sapiential literature—they realize their capacity through the acquisition of knowledge and discipline, though in this case the knowledge in question is an esoteric body of lore known as the “mystery of existence,” the נר הנהיה.\(^{43}\)

The Qumran *Hodayot* clearly know and draw on *4QInstruction*, citing some of its characteristic language, but the *Hodayot* significantly change the model of moral selfhood.\(^{44}\) For the *Hodayot*, all people, including the speaker, are characterized as being “flesh” or a “spirit of flesh,” which is synonymous with being incapable of moral action.\(^{45}\) In contrast to *4QInstruction*, which uses the two creation accounts to distinguish between two types of people, the *Hodayot* ignore the creation account of Genesis 1 and draw only on Genesis 2. The speaker refers to himself (as a part of common humanity) as a יצר עפר, “a vessel of dust,” and a יצר חמר, “a vessel of clay.” As an animated being, he is characterized by a spirit, but this spirit is a “spirit of error” (1QH* IX, 24), “a spirit of perversion” (V, 32; VIII, 18; XIX, 15), and a “spirit of flesh” (IV, 37; V, 30). Thus, as created, no one possesses moral agency, since the moral faculty is so defective as to produce only guilty actions. In contrast to *4QInstruction*, which is concerned to differentiate “horizontally” between two kinds of people, the *Hodayot* are focused on the radical “vertical” difference between God and humankind. Not surprisingly, the passages from the *Hodayot* known as the Niedrigkeitsdoxologien (i.e., glorifications of God based on the lowliness of humankind), which describe humanity as a thing “constructed of dust and kneaded with water,” characterized by “sinful guilt . . . obscene shame, and

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\(^{45}\) See the discussion by Frey, “Flesh and Spirit,” 378–85.
a source of impurity,”46 have links to the negative anthropologies expressed by Eliphaz and Bildad, which also draw a contrast between God and humanity.47

The one who speaks in the Hodayot is not, of course, simply a “vessel of clay” with a “spirit of flesh.” He is a moral agent. But how, if the Hodayot do not link this status to Genesis 1, do they account for it? As so often in Qumran literature, the solution is based on exegesis, and the key is Ezekiel’s negative anthropology and its resolution. In Ezek 36:26–27, the utterly moral incapacity represented by the people’s “heart of stone” is resolved when God removes the heart of stone and supplies instead a “heart of flesh.” That part of Ezekiel’s imagery would not suit the Hodayot, however, with the Hodayot’s use of flesh in the negative sense. They draw instead on the other part of the promise, “I will put my spirit into you” (וַאֲתָ רְוחִי אֲתֶן בְּכָלְכֶם). On at least five occasions the Hodayot use this distinctive phraseology to thank God for the gift of the spirit that enables the knowledge that makes moral agency possible (IV, 29; V, 36; VIII, 29; XX, 14–15; XXI, 34). As Ezekiel indicates, this is God’s own spirit, also referred to in the Hodayot as “[God’s] holy spirit” (VI, 24; VIII, 20, 21, 25; XV, 10; XVII, 32; XX, 15). In contrast to Ezekiel, however, where the defective piece of moral equipment is definitively removed, the speaker of the Hodayot is not freed entirely from his “spirit of flesh,” since he still expresses distress and anxiety about its power (1QHª IV, 37; cf. V, 30–32). This defective spirit remains as an alienated and rejected part of the self. The Hodayot differ from Ezekiel also in that the “otherness” of the divine spirit remains palpable, even after it has been placed in the speaker. Even though the speaker’s knowledge and voice are made possible by God’s spirit in him, he does not simply identify his subjectivity with this divine spirit. Instead he observes it acting through him, constituting his very capacity for agency. “As for me, dust and ashes, what can I devise unless you desire it? What can I plan without your will? . . . What can I say unless you open my mouth?” (1QHª XVIII, 7–9).

Selfhood in the Hodayot is thus constituted as a fundamental experiential drama, a crisis not so much of inner conflict as of inner contradiction between the defective “spirit of flesh”/“spirit of perversion” and the holy spirit. This odd but extremely powerful model of selfhood serves a variety of functions, marking the boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian, binding him to the community—but also providing an experiential warrant for the central theological affirmation of God’s absolute control of all cosmos and history. What the speaker experiences in the microcosm of his selfhood is an index of God’s surpassing agency in the world.

IV. Concluding Comments

The preceding discussion has attempted to make a programmatic case for the timeliness of a renewed examination of the various notions of the self in the Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism by focusing on the issue of moral agency. Recent work in the neuroscience of the self, as well as cross-cultural studies of agency, provides a context in which one can see how the particular formulations of the moral self in biblical and extrabiblical texts provide the necessary elements required for the development of an executive self, configuring and reconfiguring the basic options for constructing agency. A more fine-grained study of particular formulations, which this study could only begin to sketch, can clarify the culturally specific grammar of moral agency in this literature and the ways in which that basic grammar could be inflected for different purposes. By focusing on changes between the models of the moral self in the biblical and Second Temple texts, this study has underscored the need to historicize particular formulations of moral agency. Yet it is evident that the variety of models of the moral self cannot be arranged in any simple chronological development. The diversity of models within closely related texts from the Dead Sea Scrolls makes evident that a variety of different and even logically incompatible models could coexist not only within the same community but even within a single text. Thus, what comes to the fore is the way in which the social and rhetorical functions of a way of conceptualizing the moral self must always be a part of the study of the self. While the rhetorical and strategic uses of models of the self suggest that no simple correlation exists between model and deeply held subjective experience, the various models of the self do delineate the range of ways in which individuals in the culture might render their experience articulate. Thus, by exploring these models, we come as close as possible to recovering the subjective experience of selfhood in Jewish antiquity.